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INTRODUCTION
Sales transaction taxes are highly susceptible to technology fraud,1
which is an inevitable result of today’s widespread reliance on

* Richard T. Ainsworth is the Director of the Graduate Tax Program at the
Boston University School of Law, and an Adjunct Professor at the Graduate Tax
Program, NYU School of Law.
1. See John Crudele, Finally! NY Tax Cops Wise Up, Start Busting Sales Tax
“Zappers”, N.Y. POST (June 8, 2015, 9:55 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/06/08/afteryears-of-warning-state-finally-notices-sales-tax-zappers (theorizing that transaction tax
fraud may have cost the state of New York “billions in lost sales tax”). In 2009, the
New York state tax collector conducted a sting operation that targeted companies
that manufacture the point of sale (POS) devices containing sales-suppression
software (also called zappers) that facilitate the transaction fraud. Id. The state tax
collector found that of the twenty-six companies that manufacture such devices, twentyfive of them offered to help those conducting the sting operation evade taxes. Id.
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technology to document taxed transactions.2 Technology can be
(and is) manipulated to defeat the collection of these taxes.3 Both
the U.S. retail sales tax (RST) and the European value added tax
(VAT) are vulnerable to technology-based fraud.4 This Article
concerns sales suppression—intentionally not recording sales—in the
RST, and at the final stage of the VAT, the retail stage, when tax is
collected from final consumers.
The modern electronic cash register (ECR)/point of sale (POS)
These devices are essentially
system is vulnerable to fraud.5
computers with programming that is molded to meet the commercial
needs of any particular business.6 Although these devices are
functionally similar across all retail establishments, the data engines
on which they operate are not.7 In the United States, the dominant

2. See Steven Aldrich, Point-of-Sale System Basics for Retailers, ENTREPRENEUR,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/77960 (explaining that computerized POS
systems have “grown in popularity over conventional cash registers” because they not
only ring up sales, but also “amass vital, real-time information about” a business’s
customers and inventory).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 37 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1994) (involving
defendants who utilized a computer program to alter a store’s sales data, allowing
them to successfully skim over $17.1 million over a ten-year period). “Skimming” is a
method for concealing revenue. See Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Automated Sales
Suppression (Zappers): A Real Threat to Pennsylvania’s Sales and Use Tax, 8 PITT. TAX REV.
29, 33 (2010) (explaining the “simplest (nontechnological) form” of skimming
involves diverting cash from sales into a secret drawer).
4. See Ainsworth, supra note 3, at 38 (discussing how a man named Talal
Chahine and his wife, Elfat El Aouar, were able to electronically skim more than $20
million from their Detroit restaurant chain over a four year period).
5. See Chris Poulin, What Retailers Need to Learn from the Target Breach to Protect
Against Similar Attacks, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (updated Feb. 20, 2014),
https://securityintelligence.com/target-breach-protect-against-similar-attacksretailers (recounting that hackers stole “the personal and financial information of
approximately 110 million people” from Target and that it is likely that the attackers
compromised the store’s POS systems to gain access to this private data).
6. See WES WHITTEKER, SANS INST., POINT OF SALE (POS) SYSTEMS AND SECURITY 3
(Oct. 2014), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/bestprac/point-salepos-systems-security-35357 (explaining that POS technology has existed since the late
1900’s with the advent of the first mechanical cash register in 1879). In the late
1980’s, POS technology was drastically overhauled with the advent of modern day
personal computer technology. Id. An example of a current POS device “would be
the check-out counter at a retail or grocery store.” Id.
7. See DB-Engines Ranking, DB-ENGINES, http://db-engines.com/en/ranking (last
visited May 17, 2016) (ranking some 264 different database management systems or
database engines that help run POS technology).
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databases are MS SQL Server, MS Access, and MySQL;8 the first two
are Microsoft products and the last is an Oracle product.9
Unsurprisingly, the popularity of Microsoft (“MS”) Windows made
Microsoft the “go-to” database provider for developers seeking easy
installations.10 Recently, and most notably in Europe, open source11
POS systems based on Linux, a competing operating system, are
becoming more common than Microsoft databases.12 Furthermore,
MS databases are not found in the new Apple iOS POS systems or
Square Register, which uses an open source PostgreSQL database.13
This Article will focus on a particular POS system called Profitek,

8. See id. (ranking POS data engines by popularity, with MySQL ranked second,
Microsoft SQL Server ranked third, and Microsoft Access ranked seventh out of a
total of 264 engines); see also DB-Engines Ranking-Trend Popularity, DB-ENGINES,
http://db-engines.com/en/ranking_trend (last visited May 17, 2016) (calculating
MySQL, Microsoft SQL Server, and Microsoft Access as some of the most popular
database engines over time).
9. MySQL Editions, MYSQL, http://www.mysql.com/products (last visited May 17,
2016); SQL Server 2014 & the Data Platform, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/enus/server-cloud/products/sql-server (last visited May 17, 2016); Access, MICROSOFT,
https://products.office.com/en-us/access?legRedir=true&CorrelationId=0da4117d-7af049f0-b001-2918c366e7d1 (last visited May 17, 2016).
10. See Roy Furchgott, With Software, Till Tampering Is Hard to Find, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/technology/30zapper.html
(finding that eighty-five percent of all POS systems run on Microsoft (“MS”)
Windows systems).
11. Open source refers to computer software with its source code made available
(with a license) in which the copyright holder provides the rights to study, change,
and distribute the software to anyone and for any purpose. Thus, the Apple systems
are closed, and the Linux systems are open, and can be more easily updated or
enhanced. What Is Linux?, LINUX.COM, https://www.linux.com/what-is-linux (last
visited May 17, 2016).
12. See Seamus Quinn, Europeans Like it Bigger, Newer and with More Linux,
POWERWIRE (Mar. 19. 2015), http://powerwire.eu/europeans-like-it-bigger-newerand-with-more-linux (indicating that an IBM i (IBM’s operating system) marketplace
survey revealed that Europe uses Linux more than North America does). The
survey’s results showed that “56.6% of European Power i users [were] . . . running
Linux” compared to only 42.7% of users in the United States. Id.
13. See
Compare
iPad
POS
Software,
SOFTWARE
ADVICE,
http://www.softwareadvice.com/retail/ipad-pos-comparison/?more=true#more (last
visited May 17, 2016) (comparing 124 software systems that can be run on Apple’s
POS system, and not listing any MS databases); see also Steve Olenski, Are iPad POS
26 2013, 1:37 PM),
Systems the Future for Retailers?, FORBES (Sept.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolenski/2013/09/26/are-ipad-pos-systems-thefuture-for-retailers/#42e73af42115 (describing how retailers and restaurants are
moving towards Apple POS systems using the iPad instead of cash registers); Serious
about Security, SQUARE SECURITY, https://squareup.com/security (last visited May 17,
2016) (indicating that Square uses its own POS software).
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manufactured in Vancouver by InfoSpec, which uses an MS SQL
server, and can be purchased with a dedicated sales suppression
device—the Profitek Zapper.14
The cash register/POS market divides along database lines15 and
the market further subdivides when attributes such as operator
language preferences are considered.16 For example, Chinese
restaurants with predominantly Chinese employees will prefer a POS
system with Chinese language functionality, but a French restaurant
with French-speaking employees would prefer a different system with
a French language functionality.17
As a result, the market for POS systems is both niche and
international, and so are sales suppression software applications.18 It
is common, therefore, to find that the same person who sells an
ECR/POS system is also able to provide the business with the zapper
that can suppress sales recorded in that specific system.19 Zappers are
not universal, but rather are system-specific.20 Zappers and ECR/POS
systems travel together, and, in some instances, the zapper’s elegance

14. See Ian Mulgrew, Richmond Company that Sold Software to Help Restaurants Avoid
Taxes
Acquitted,
VANCOUVER
SUN
(July
16,
2013),
www.vancouversun.com/technology/mulgrew+richmond+company+that+sold+softw
are+help+restaurants+avoid+taxes+acquitted/8673669/story.html
(reporting
outcome of case in which InfoSpec was charged with fraud for selling Zapper
software for its POS systems).
15. See Furchgott, supra note 10 (noting that consulting firm Frost & Sullivan
calculated that eight-five percent of POS systems run on Windows).
16. See
Chinese
Restaurant
POS
System,
POS
NATION,
https://posnation.com/chinese-sushi-pos-system (last visited May 17, 2016)
(explaining that POS Nation’s POS system has a second language feature that
allowed receipts to be printed in either English or Chinese because such a feature is
“essential for Chinese speaking chefs and staff”).
17. See id.; see also EPOS Multi-Lingual, English, French & Spanish in One Software,
EPOS SOFTWARE & SYS. BLOG, http://possystemblog.com/epos-multi-lingual-englishfrench-spanish-one-software (last visited May 17, 2016) (explaining that the PosBill
POS system offers multiple language preferences).
18. See Furchgott, supra note 10 (indicating that fraudsters have used automated
sales suppression devices, or zappers, all around the world, specifically in Germany,
Sweden, Brazil, Australia, France, Canada, the United States, and the Netherlands).
19. See id.
20. See Ainsworth, supra note 3, at 33 (noting that zappers are cash skimming
software applications; further explaining that zappers are programming options
added to POS networks and are “carried on memory sticks, removable CDs or . . .
accessed through an [I]nternet link,” so, because they are not “integrated into
operating systems,” they are hard to detect). Throughout this Article, zappers are
referenced as both a generic software and as the specific Profitek Zapper
manufactured by InfoSpec.
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and effectiveness may actually be the most compelling feature.21 A
high quality zapper responds to suppression requests by entering the
ECR/POS database and deleting selective sales, as well as
recalculating individual receipts and the taxes due.22 It will re-order
all sales slips and adjust the internal ledger, which informs the
operator how much extra cash is in the till to withdraw so that bank
deposits will match the adjusted sales totals.23
An application that effectively manipulates the digital records of a
specific POS system will quickly travel to other countries and states
with the associated POS system for which it was designed.24
Therefore, zappers initially developed on short notice for use in one
jurisdiction can quickly become a concern for a neighboring tax
authority. Such is the case with the Profitek POS system, sold and
created by InfoSpec Systems Inc., and the zapper manufactured by
the same company to defeat its own recordkeeping functionality.25
This Article follows the InfoSpec/Profitek system and its associated
zapper as it migrated from the Canadian restaurant market into the
U.S. market. It describes the time-gap between the beginning of the
audit cycle involved in the InfoSpec/Profitek litigation in Canada—

21. See Richard T. Ainsworth, Zappers and Phantomware: The Need for Fraud
Prevention Technology, 50 TAX NOTES INT’L 1017, 1018 (2008). Zappers and
phantomware are software that can either be factory installed or added on to ECR
and POS systems post-sale. Id. While zappers “have no legitimate purpose other
than to facilitate cash skimming at the point of sale,” phantomware can be used for
legitimate purposes—although these purposes remain somewhat obscure.
Id. Phantomware are not disclosed in user manuals; therefore, they are difficult to
detect even during an audit. Id. Moreover, a fraudster can use phantomware to
engage in skimming with the proper training. Id. Zappers are also difficult to detect
because they are usually contained on an external device that the fraudster connects
to the POS system; however, they can be detected if not used carefully. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Furchgott, supra note 10 (clarifying that zappers were found to have been
used all across the world from Germany to the United States).
25. See About Profitek, PROFITEK, http://www.profitek.com/About (last visited May
17, 2016) (explaining that Profitek specializes in POS software for the hospitality and
retail industry); InfoSpec Systems Inc.:
About Company, FIBRE2FASHION.COM,
http://softwaresolutions.fibre2fashion.com/company/infospec (last visited May 17,
2016) (stating that InfoSpec Systems is the developer of Profitek and Profitek’s POS
systems); Selling Tax-Evasion Software Is Legal, B.C. Court of Appeal Rules, THE GLOBE &
MAIL (last updated July 18, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
technology/tech-news/not-fraud-to-sell-tax-evasion-software-bc-court-of-appealrules/article13295953 (discussing that InfoSpec Systems manufactured a zapper for
use on their own POS system).
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October 4, 200026—and the beginning of the first two U.S.
investigations involving the same company and the same zapper—in
2014 and 2015. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is
conducting an investigation in Chicago (public documents began to
appear October 21, 2014), and the Washington State Attorney
General is conducting another investigation (public documents
began to appear July 13, 2015).27 If the InfoSpec/Profitek system and its
associated zapper crossed the U.S./Canadian border during the
Canadian litigation, it would mean that this fraud was present and
remained undetected in the United States for approximately fifteen
years. This is a long time for fraud to remain hidden in the U.S. market.
This Article suggests that once a zapper and a vulnerable POS
system are identified by one tax authority, there is considerable value
in sharing this information with other tax administrations. There is
no point in reinventing the wheel. This kind of tax enforcement and
information sharing is commonplace among tax administrations. For
example, when the IRS became serious about combatting refund
fraud, it rolled out a technology-intensive pilot program to test the
capability of W-2 Verification Codes on filed W-2s.28 The authenticity
of the Form W-2 data included with the Form 1040 was examined
with technology during the 2016 filing season.29 This approach to
verifying the tax reporting of critical wage data had long been
championed in the VAT, but in the context of invoice verification.30
Thus, the U.S. pilot is a similar income tax application of a previously
successful VAT enforcement effort. Similar sharing of information

26. See Selling Tax-Evasion Software Is Legal, B.C. Court of Appeal Rules, supra note 25
(“The case dates back to an eight-year period between Oct. 4, 2000 and Aug. 28, 2008.”).
27. See Affidavit for Search Warrant at 3, State v. Yin, No. 15-1-12052-9 (Sup. Ct.
King Co. Wash. July 13, 2015) (indicating the likelihood that the defendant sold a
Profitek POS system and zapper to a Washington restaurant owner); see also Amy
Clancy, Bellevue Restaurant Owner Charged in Tax Fraud Case, KIRO-TV (Feb. 6, 2016, 9:51
AM), http://www.kiro7.com/news/kiro-news-app/restaurants-cheating-washingtontaxpayers-out-of-millions/61479512 (discussing the tax fraud case against a
restaurant owner, Wong, and her use of a zapper to hide taxable income (here, retail
sales tax) by essentially erasing it from her transaction log to avoid paying state sales
tax in the state of Washington).
28. IRS
Tests
W-2
Verification
Code
for
Filing
Season
2016,
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/IRS-Tests-W-2-Verification-Code (last visited May 17, 2016).
29. Id.; IRS Starts Anti-Fraud Program Using Codes Input by Payroll Processors to Verify
W-2s, BNA, http://www.bna.com/IRS-starts-anti-fraud-program-n57982059210 (last
visited May 17, 2016).
30. Richard T. Ainsworth, Real-Time Solution to Refund Fraud: VAT Lessons from
Belgium, Brazil, and Quebec, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 533, 534 (2012).
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will surely help enforcement efforts when a zapper is identified in a
commonly used POS system.
I.

THE CANADIAN FRAUD CASES

Canadian tax authorities brought cases against InfoSpec Systems,
the company that made the Profitek Zapper, the salesman who sold
them, and the restaurants that used them, including the Foody
Goody Chinese Buffet Restaurant and the Buffet Square in
Winnipeg, Manitoba.31
A. Salesmen
The prosecution and subsequent conviction of David Au, an
Infospec salesman, illustrates the Canadian enforcement effort aimed
at curbing the use of zappers to avoid paying sales tax.
Mr. Au pled guilty on December 16, 2010, to defrauding the public
by selling zappers to restaurant owners.32 “Between October [4,]
2000 and August [28,] 2008, Mr. Au sold the Profitek system, along
with the zapper program, to [twenty-three] known restaurant owners”
who used it to delete “cash sales for the purpose of evading income
and sales taxes” that were due to provincial and federal
governments.33 Mr. Au’s sales territory was the Lower Mainland and
elsewhere in British Columbia.34 On average, Mr. Au sold eight
zappers each year over an eight-year span.35
At the time of his sentencing, fourteen of the twenty-three
restaurants to which he had sold zappers had been fully audited.36
Over $14,000,000 (Canadian) in sales had been suppressed by these
establishments, resulting in tax losses of $2,400,000 in federal income
tax and $1,000,000 in Goods and Service Taxes (GST).37 Mr. Au not
31. See Nelson Bennet, Richmond Company Fined $100K for Tax Evasion Software,
BUS. VANCOUVER (July 24, 2012, 11:00 PM), https://www.biv.com/article/2012/7/
richmond-company-fined-100k-for-tax-evasion-softwa (reporting on the outcomes of
cases against InfoSpec and David Au); Alexandra Paul, Tax Software’s Maker not Guilty;
FREE
PRESS
(July
19,
2013
1:00
AM),
Eateries
Are,
WINNIPEG
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/business/tax-softwares-maker-not-guilty-eateriesare-216117151.html (stating that the owners of Foody Goody and Buffet Square pled
guilty to tax evasion in 2007–2009 and 2006–2008, and providing background
information about the court case).
32. R v. Au, 2011 B.C.S.C. 75 ¶ 1 (Can.).
33. Id. ¶ 4.
34. Id. ¶ 3.
35. Id. ¶ 11.
36. Id. ¶ 27.
37. Id.
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only sold the Profitek Zapper, but he also provided the purchaser
with troubleshooting, technical support, and servicing related to the
zapper, as opposed to Profitek’s customer support.38 After his
customers purchased the Profitek POS, Mr. Au would offer the
zapper on a CD for an additional $1500, $400 of which represented
his commission.39 Customers commonly paid for the zapper in cash
and allegedly did not receive a receipt.40 The court sentenced Mr. Au
to thirty months in jail.41
B. Restaurants
The Profitek Zapper traveled so well in Canada that on May 1,
2013, the Canadian Revenue Authority (CRA) announced that it had
found the Profitek Zappers in two Winnipeg, Manitoba restaurants,
1438 miles east of Vancouver.42 Both establishments were Chinese—
the Foody Goody Chinese Buffet and the Buffet Square.43
Aggregate overdue taxes and fines, amounting to $731,986 were
imposed after the owners entered guilty pleas.44 A portion of the fine
was specifically imposed because the restaurants “possess[ed]
software [that was] designed to suppress electronic sales
transactions.”45 These zapper-specific fines were authorized under
the relevant Manitoba statute.46 At the time there was no comparable
38. Id. ¶ 5.
39. Id. ¶ 11.
40. R v. InfoSpec Sys. Inc., 2013 B.C.C.A. 333, ¶ 14 (Can.).
41. R v. Au, 2011 B.C.S.C. 75 ¶ 33.
42. See Paul, supra note 31 (“The case with the two very different outcomes played
out in two courtrooms thousands of kilometers apart in different jurisdictions.”);
Winnipeg, Manitoba is 2314 kilometers (1438 miles) from Vancouver, British
Columbia. DISTANCE CANADA, http://www.distancecanada.com (select “Manitoba
(MB)” under the “Select from State” tab, then select “Winnipeg” from the “Select
City” tab; then select “British Columbia (BC)” from the “Select to State” tab; finally,
select “Vancouver” from the “Select City” tab).
43. See Buffet Square, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/biz/buffet-square-winnipeg (last
visited May 17, 2016); Foody Goody Chinese Buffet Restaurant, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Foody-Goody-Chinese-BuffetRestaurant/132782873412925 (last visited May 17, 2016).
44. Winnipeg Restauranteurs Taste Tax Evasion Fines, KNOWLEDGE BUREAU (May 13, 2013),
http://www.knowledgebureau.com/index.php/news/article/winnipeg-restauranteurstaste-tax-evasion-fines; see Foody Goody and Buffet Square Plead Guilty to Numerous Charges of
Tax Evasion, METRO NEWS (May 1, 2013), http://www.metronews.ca/news/winnipeg/
2013/05/01/foody-goody-and-buffet-square-plead-guilty-to-numerous-charges-of-taxevasion.html.
45. Winnipeg Restauranteurs Taste Tax Evasion Fines, supra note 44.
46. Id. The Manitoba Tax Administration and Miscellaneous Taxes Act, R.S.M.
1987, c. R.150, § 18.1 (2016), provides:
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anti-zapper law in place at the Canadian federal level.47 Zapper-fines
in each case equaled 100% of the restaurant owners’ unreported
Manitoba sales tax, plus $500.48
C. Manufacturer
The CRA also pursued InfoSpec, a Vancouver company that
manufactured the Profitek POS system and zapper and hired the
salesmen to sell the two as a bundle.49 InfoSpec did not confine its
distribution of its sales suppression technology to British Columbia.50
InfoSpec customizes the Profitek POS system based on each
customer’s needs.51 Right out of the box, the Profitek system permits
customers to void transactions, but does not allow them to
permanently delete the transactions from the system.52
The Profitek Zapper is also customized so that it works with the
customer’s specific Profitek system.53 Once installed, the zapper
allows a user to completely delete selected sales transactions from the

No person shall possess, use, sell or offer to sell, update, upgrade or
maintain software that is designed for, or is capable of,
(a) suppressing the creation of electronic records of sale transactions that a
taxpayer is required to keep under this Act; or
(b) modifying, hiding, or deleting such records without keeping the original
data and providing a ready means of access to them.
47. In its March 21, 2013 budget announcement, the Canadian Federal
Government proposed “new administrative monetary penalties and criminal offences
under the Excise Tax Act (i.e., in respect of GST/HST) and the Income Tax Act to
combat this type of tax evasion [evasion through sales manipulation software].” CAN.
DEP’T OF FIN., JOBS, GROWTH, AND LONG-TERM PROSPERITY: ECONOMIC ACTION PLAN
2013, at 381 (2013), http://www.budget.gc.ca/2013/doc/plan/budget2013eng.pdf. The proposals became effective January 1, 2014 and created new criminal
offenses “[f]or the use, possession, acquisition, manufacture, development, sale,
possession for sale, offer for sale or otherwise making available of [Electronic
Suppression of Sales] software.” Id. at 382.
48. See R.S.M. 1987, c. R.150, § 76(2), (4)–(5) (2016) (setting the minimum fine
for a first-time offender guilty of tax evasion at $500, and requiring an additional fine
for the amount of tax sought to be evaded).
49. See Matthew McClearn, Clamping Down on High-Tech Tax Evaders, CANADIAN
BUS. (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.canadianbusiness.com/economy/clamping-downon-high-tech-tax-evaders (discussing the Canada Revenue Agency’s (CRA)
prosecution of InfoSpec).
50. See Paul, supra note 31 (stating that InfoSpec sold its Profitek POS system and
accompanying zapper to restaurants in Winnipeg).
51. R v. InfoSpec Sys. Inc., 2013 B.C.C.A. 333, para. 6 (Can.).
52. Id.
53. Id. para. 7.
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sales records.54 As a result, the Profitek system, with a zapper, will
produce records that under-report income and will eliminate records
of sales taxes collected by the user.55
R v. InfoSpec Systems Inc.56 is an appeal from InfoSpec’s conviction in
the Supreme Court of British Columbia for defrauding the public
through its sales of the Profitek Zapper.57 The appellate court
determined that the sale of a zapper, standing alone, was not an act that
reasonable people would consider dishonest.58 As a result, there was
neither fraud nor attempted fraud in this case.59 The court stated:
It is noteworthy that the law does not prohibit the making, possession, or
sale of a zapper. As InfoSpec points out, the Criminal Code contains a
number of provisions that criminalize the possession, making, or
selling of certain things capable of being used to commit
crimes. . . . I do not accept the Crown’s submission that InfoSpec
“engaged in a course of dealings that was by its very nature
dishonest.” InfoSpec participated in commercial transactions
involving the sale of a computer program that is not prohibited by
law; the restaurants got what they paid for. Whatever reasonable
people might think about the propriety of such a sale, I am unable
to say they would consider the vendor to have acted dishonestly. If
Parliament considers a prohibition on zappers necessary to thwart tax
evasion, then it is open to it to enact a provision similar to those to
which I have just referred.60

This holding is consistent with the tax assessment raised on the
Manitoba restaurants considered above.61 In those cases, zapper-specific
penalties were imposed only at the provincial level62 because there was
no comparable anti-zapper law at the federal level.63 As a result,

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 2013 B.C.C.A. 333 (Can.).
57. See id. paras. 10–11 (explaining that the Crown charged InfoSpec with one
count of fraud over $5000 under section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46; four counts of evading income tax under section 239(1)(b) of the
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1; and four counts of evading the Goods
and Services Tax under section 327(1)(b)(i) of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E15, but that the court only convicted InfoSpec on the fraud count).
58. Id. para. 24.
59. Id.
60. Id. paras. 21–22 (emphasis added).
61. See Winnipeg Restauranteurs Taste Tax Evasion Fines, supra note 44.
62. See supra note 46 (quoting from the relevant Manitoba tax law imposed on
the restaurant owners).
63. InfoSpec Sys. Inc., 2013 B.C.C.A. 333, para. 21.
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Manitoba zapper-fines in each case equaled 100% of the unreported
Manitoba sales tax, plus $500, but the federal fines were zero.64
Although this decision was effectively rendered irrelevant by the
express prohibition of electronic sales suppression (ESS) software in
the March 21, 2013 Budget announcement,65 it has considerable
relevance for the United States and the individual states, many of
which find themselves in a position analogous to that in InfoSpec
Systems.66
As a result of this holding, the Canadian Federal
Government proposed and adopted “new administrative monetary
penalties and criminal offences under the Excise Tax Act . . . and
the Income Tax Act to combat [ESS] tax evasion.”67 Offenses now
include “the use, possession, acquisition, manufacture,
development, sale, possession for sale, offer for sale or otherwise
making available of ESS software.”68
The Canadian federal penalties have a progressive cast.69 The
penalties allow a measured response to ESS, with a clear distinction
between the activities of salesmen and end-users.70 They are both
civil and criminal.71 Civil penalties include relatively moderate fines,
while criminal penalties include heavy fines and jail time.
Civil penalties for the use or possession of ESS are $5,000 for a first
offence, $50,000 for subsequent offenses, and double for selling or
manufacturing ESS. Criminal penalties for sale or manufacture of

64. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
65. CAN. DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 47, at 381–82.
66. See Furchgott, supra note 10 (explaining that zapper software may be a
growing problem in the United States because only two zapper cases have been
prosecuted by U.S. authorities, but the technology exists and instances of its use in
the United States are likely going unnoticed).
67. CAN. DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 47, at 381 (indicating that the changes were
effective January 1, 2014).
68. Id. at 382.
69. See R.S.M. 1987, c. R.150, § 76(4)–(5) (2016) (raising both fines and prison
time for second and subsequent offenses effective January 1, 2014). The Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) conducted a nation-wide study of sales suppression, which
led to the new laws. See CRA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE COMPLIANCE DIVISION, HIGH RISK
COMPLIANCE STRATEGY DIVISION, ELECTRONIC SUPPRESSION OF SALES (ESS) REPORT ON
PHASE ONE OF CRA’S STRATEGY TO ADDRESS ESS, APRIL 1, 2008 TO MARCH 31, 2010
(2010) (redacted version on file with author).
70. See CAN. DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 47, at 381 (assessing twice the fines for the
manufacture or sale of zapper software as for possession, acquisition, or use of
the software).
71. Id. at 381–82 (listing the new monetary penalties and criminal offenses).
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ESS include up to $1,000,000 in fines and five years in prison.72 The
U.S. states that have adopted anti-zapper legislation largely follow the
language of the Canadian statute, although the monetary penalties in
the United States tend to be much lower.73
II. THE AMERICAN FRAUD CASES
It would be surprising if InfoSpec’s Profitek POS system and
related Profitek Zapper had not crossed the international border and
entered the United States. InfoSpec does not characterize itself as a
purely Canadian company. It sees itself as an international provider of
POS systems that is fully operational in North America with a distinct
bilingual advantage for Chinese/English users, as well as any other
language supported by Windows. The company’s web site explains:
Profitek is a leading software development company specializing
in Point-of-Sale (POS) solutions for the Hospitality and Retail
industries. Founded in 1985 and based in Vancouver, Canada,
Profitek has three offices in Canada, two offices in China and a growing
dealership network across North America. It has been ranked among the
top 100 technology companies in [British Columbia] . . . since 1999.
Profitek is unique in providing dedicated POS software suites for
the Hospitality and Retail sectors. Mixed hospitality and retail
environments such as museums, zoos, campuses, or any
organization with both retail and food service operations are ideal
candidates for Profitek’s solutions.
Profitek was the first POS solution in North America to provide
dual language operation. The software displays and prints in any
second language supported by Windows and allows viewing and printing of
orders and receipts in either language, based on the preference of each user.74

Given Profitek’s international scope, its zappers should have been
found in the United States roughly sixteen years ago in 2000, when
the Profitek Zapper was first surfacing in Canadian audits.75 The
migration of high-tech tax evasion software across the Canadian
border presents new challenges to U.S. tax enforcement officials.
The most obvious targeted U.S. jurisdiction for InfoSpec products
would be Washington State. Seattle, Washington is 142 miles south of

72. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), § 239.1(2)–(3); see also CAN. DEP’T OF FIN., supra
note 47, at 381–82.
73. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 7153.6(2)(A) (West 2016).
74. About Profitek, PROFITEK, http://www.profitek.com/About (last visited May 17,
2016) (emphasis added).
75. See Furchgott, supra note 10 (noting that Quebec’s tax agency reported a case
of zapper software sales in the year 2000).
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Vancouver, British Columbia, and is considerably closer than
Winnipeg, Manitoba. Nevertheless, the first public announcement
by any U.S. tax authority that the Profitek Zapper may have been
used in the United States came out of Chicago, Illinois, a full 2202
miles east of the company’s head offices.76 The second public
announcement comes from Seattle, Washington, which is much
closer to Vancouver than to Chicago.77
The Chicago investigation is focused on several specific restaurants
all owned by the same individual who may have used the Profitek
Zapper.78 All of the restaurants used the model INFOSPEC SYSTEMS
INC. MODEL PROFITEK RM SYSTEM V10.0.3 and an accompanying
Hu Xiaojun had an ownership interest in all the
Zapper.79
restaurants, which were all located in the China Square Mall.80
In Seattle, the Washington Attorney General’s investigation initially
focused on an alleged Profitek Zapper salesman.81 However, the
focus has recently turned to one alleged Profitek Zapper-user who
allegedly secured the Profitek Zapper from the previously identified
salesman.82 The case involved a restaurant owner named Yu-Ling
Wong who had been suppressing sales tax information for three
years.83 After investigators discovered the tax fraud, they questioned
Wong, who pointed them to John Yin, a sixty-four-year-old selfemployed software salesman.84 Yin admitted to selling Profitek
Zapper software.85 Other cases in Seattle may follow.
Thus, similar to the litigation in Canada, there are signs that
enforcement litigation is beginning in the United States against
restaurants that may have used Profitek Zappers in Chicago and the
salesmen who are allegedly selling Profitek Zappers in Washington.
There is yet to be any evidence of an enforcement action against the
manufacturer, InfoSpec Systems, but this may be just a matter of time.

76. Application and Affidavit for a Search Warrant ¶ 43, United States v. Lao You Ju,
No. 1:14-mc-00571 (Oct. 21, 2014 N.D. Ill.) [hereinafter Ju Search Warrant Affidavit].
77. Affidavit for Search Warrant, State v. Yin, No. 15-1-12052-9 SEA (July 13, 2015
King Cty. Super. Ct. Was.) [hereinafter Yin Search Warrant Affidavit].
78. Ju Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 76, ¶¶ 42–43.
79. Id.
80. Id. ¶¶ 3–6.
81. Yin Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 77, at 1, 3.
82. Information, State v. Wong, No. 16-1-00179-0 (King Cty. Sup. Ct. Was. Feb. 5,
2016) (accusing Yu-Ling Wong of unlawful use of sales suppression software).
83. Id. at 2.
84. Yin Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 77, at 3.
85. Id. at 4.
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A. U.S. Restaurants
On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, the FBI filed nine Applications and
Affidavits for Search Warrants with U.S. Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T.
Gilbert of the Northern District of Illinois.86 The FBI wanted to
search each of the nine Chicago restaurants owned by Hu Xiaojun,87
on the grounds that Hu was systematically under-reporting income.88
The POS system at each restaurant was “INFOSPEC SYSTEMS INC.
MODEL PROFITEK RM SYSTEM V10.0.3,”89 which was the most
common system in use at Chinese restaurants in Chicago’s
Chinatown.90 Alleged violations included (a) conspiracy to commit
tax fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (b) tax fraud in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 7206; and (c) wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.91
No Illinois state violations were referenced.92 In each of the nine
cases, the search warrant was (1) formally entered, (2) sealed upon
motion by the Government, and (3) marked Returned Executed in the
court reporting system on April 13, 2015.93 However, the execution
date for the warrant in each case was October 21, 2014.94

86. See sources cited infra note 93; see also Ju Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note
76, at 1 (listing a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent as the
applicant).
87. Hu Xiaojun, a “celebrity chef” also known as Tony Hu, is regarded as the
“Mayor of Chinatown” in Chicago. Daniel Gerzina, Mayor No More? Tony Hu
Planning to Sell Most of His Chinatown Restaurants, CHI. EATER (Feb. 16, 2015, 1:07 PM),
http://chicago.eater.com/2015/2/16/8046983/tony-hu-selling-most-chinatownrestaurants.
88. Peter Frost, Tony Hu Probed for Suspected Conspiracy, Tax Fraud and Wire Fraud,
CRAIN’S CHIC. BUS. (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/
20150428/BLOGS09/150429783/tony-hu-probed-for-suspected-conspiracy-tax-fraudand-wire-fraud.
89. Ju Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 76, ¶¶ 42–43.
90. See id. ¶ 43 (“The waiter [at the Lao Sze Chuan—Uptown restaurant] . . . told
the agents that a number of Chinese restaurants utilized the same system, which was
obtained from what the employee described as a company located in the Chinatown
Square mall.”); see also id. ¶ 43 n.10 (“The Chinatown Square mall is located in
Chicago’s Chinatown neighborhood. A number of the Tony Gourmet Group
restaurants, including Lao Sze Chuan (Subject Business 2), Lao Beijing (Subject
Business 4), Lao Shanghai (Subject Business 5), Lao Ma La (Subject Business 7), and
Lao Yunnan (Subject Business 9), are located within the China [sic] Square mall.”).
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id.
93. The nine cases are:
(1) United States v. Lao Shanghai, No. 1:14-mc-00570 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014);
(2) United States v. Lao Yunnan, No. 1:14-mc-00574 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014);
(3) United States v. Lao Sze Chuan, No. 1:14-mc-00566 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014);
(4) United States v. Lao Sze Chuan, No. 1:14-mc-00567 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014);
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There is one case that does not follow this timeline. The court
issued two warrants in United States v. Lao You Ju: one on October 21,
2014, and one on October 24, 2014.95 The latter date was the same
date that each of the initial nine warrants were “Returned Executed” as
indicated on the court dockets.96 The issuance of a second warrant
seems to have allowed the first warrant on the Lao You Ju restaurant
to enter the public record on Friday, April 13, 2015, perhaps because
the second warrant request opened a second case against the
restaurant.97 A reporter for the Chicago Sun-Times found the court’s
publication of the first warrant, and the paper ran an article on
Monday, April 27, 2015, focusing on the FBI allegations in the first
search warrant on the Lao You Ju restaurant.98
In 110 pages, the affidavit sets out the major arguments of the tax
fraud case against all nine restaurants.99 The analysis revolves around
an apparent “second set of books” constructed from intercepted email attachments. The FBI compared the information with the
restaurants’ filing positions on federal income tax returns and Illinois
sales tax returns.100 Monthly bank deposits provided further contrast.101
The FBI asserted probable cause that the restaurants
underreported their gross income by demonstrating, for example,
that the Lao Sze Chuan—Downers Grove restaurant allegedly
suppressed roughly forty percent of its sales from 2008 to 2010.102 To

(5) United States v. Lao Sze Chuan, No. 1:14-mc-00568 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014);
(6) United States v. Lao Ma La, No. 1:14-mc-00572 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014);
(7) United States v. Lao Hunan, No. 1:14-mc-00573 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014);
(8) United States v. Lao Beijing, No. 1:14-mc-00569 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014);
(9) United States v. Lao You Ju, No. 1:14-mc-00580 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2014); United
States v. Lao You Ju, No. 1:14-mc-00571 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014).
94. See sources cited supra note 93.
95. United States v. Lao You Ju, No. 1:14-mc-00580 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2014);
United States v. Lao You Ju, No. 1:14-mc-00571 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014).
96. Id.
97. When the second search warrant was issued, the court assigned a second
docket number.
98. Jon Seidel, Feds Went to Chinatown Looking for Food—and Fraud, CHI. SUN-TIMES
(Apr. 27, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/feds-went-tochinatown-looking-for-food-and-fraud. Personal communication with Jon Seidel on
October 25, 2015 indicates that his story was based on “case number 14-MC-571 in
the Northern District of Illinois,” which is the United States of America v. Lao You Ju
search warrant filed on October 21, 2014.
99. See generally Ju Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 76.
100. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9, 39, 52–55, 58–71.
101. Id. ¶¶ 88, 93, 97, 104, 108, 113, 120, 131, 140.
102. Id. ¶¶ 52–55.
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do this, the FBI compared the manager’s spreadsheets of sales with
the gross receipts filed on the federal corporate return.103
The FBI is clearly interested in cash sales.104 The warrant strongly
suggests that each of the nine restaurants systematically suppressed
cash sales. Undercover agents went to each restaurant, purchased
meals with cash, and secured a receipt that indicated payment for
the meal and payment of the Illinois sales and use tax that was
included in the charge.105
In constructing the tentative “second set of books,” the FBI broke
down the amounts received into cash and credit card transactions.106
When these figures were compared with the restaurants’ monthly
Illinois sales and use tax returns from Forms ST-1 and E911
Surcharge Return, it appeared that the amounts declared on the tax
returns were uniformly lower, suggesting suppression.107 To make its
point even clearer, the FBI further aligned monthly bank deposit
data.108 For example, the average monthly deposit for Lao Sze Chuan
was $230,812, but the average monthly receipt reported on Illinois
Form ST-1 was $214,995.109 Similarly, the average monthly deposit for
Lao You Ju was $94,330, but the average monthly receipts reported
on Illinois Form ST-1 was $82,468.110 In addition, the bank records
show that for month after month and for restaurant after restaurant,
no cash was deposited into corporate bank accounts, suggesting that
a large portion of the (allegedly) suppressed sales were the cash
transactions.111 The bank deposits on record are primarily credit card
merchant account deposits.112
There is no mention of a Profitek Zapper in the search warrant.113
However, given the presence of the Profitek POS system in each of
the nine restaurants,114 knowledge of the prior litigation in Canada,115

103. Id. ¶ 55 (containing a chart showing that the restaurant reported gross sales
figures below actual sales figures).
104. Id. ¶ 4.
105. Id. ¶¶ 87, 96, 103, 107, 112, 119, 130, 139.
106. Id. ¶¶ 84–85, 89–90, 94, 98, 105, 109, 117, 128, 137.
107. See id. ¶¶ 57–58, 60–61, 63–64, 66–67, 69–70, 72–73, 75–76, 78–79, 81–83, 93,
97, 104, 108, 113, 120, 131, 140.
108. Id. ¶¶ 88, 93, 97, 104, 108, 113, 120, 131, 140.
109. Id. ¶ 93.
110. Id. ¶ 113.
111. Id. ¶¶ 88, 93–94, 97, 104, 108, 113, 120, 131, 140.
112. Id. ¶¶ 85, 90, 94, 101, 105, 110, 117, 128, 137.
113. See generally id.
114. Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
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and the passage of anti-zapper legislation in Illinois,116 it is entirely
possible that the FBI might have been using the Chicago
investigations to find a Profitek Zapper in Chicago.117 If the FBI
found a zapper, and if any of the nine restaurants used the zapper
after January 1, 2014, then the state charges against Hu Xiaojun
could be criminal.118
On August 16, 2013, the Governor of Illinois signed into law Public
Act 098-0352, which made the knowing sale, purchase, installation,
use, or transfer of zappers a Class 3 felony.119
Under Illinois law, a Class 3 felony is punishable by two to five
years’ imprisonment.120 An “extended term” Class 3 felony is
punishable by five to ten years in prison.121 Despite the criminal
statute, each of the ten cases—one against each of Hu Xiaojun’s nine
restaurants including an additional case for the second warrant for
the Lao You Ju restaurant—are now formally closed in court records.122
Consequently, there is no tax case in the public record. The FBI
actions were considered “mysterious” in the local media.123 Hu
Xiaojun was in the process of selling his restaurant and moving out of

115. R v. Au, 2011 B.C.S.C. 75 (Can.); R v. InfoSpec Sys. Inc., 2013 BCCA 333
(Can.); see sources cited supra note 44 (reporting about the fines imposed on the
Canadian restaurants after they pled guilty).
116. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105 / 14 (2014) (effective Jan. 1, 2014).
117. The Search Warrant only references that the State of Illinois Department of
Revenue Publication 113 from October 2011, titled Retailer’s Overview of Sales and
Use Tax and Prepaid Wireless E911 Surcharge, requires that retailers keep “the cash
register tapes and other data that provide a daily record of the gross amount of sales”
for three and a half years after the date they file an ST-1 return. Ju Search Warrant
Affidavit, supra note 76, ¶ 41.
118. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105 / 14. Illinois passed legislation effective January 1,
2014 that made zapper use a Class 3 felony. Id.
119. 2013 Ill. Laws 4556 (codified at 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105 / 14) (“Any person
who knowingly sells, purchases, installs, transfers, possesses, uses, or accesses any
automated sales suppression device, zapper, or phantom-ware in this State is guilty of
a Class 3 felony.”).
120. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 5-4.5-40(a) (2016).
121. Id.
122. See sources cited supra note 93.
123. Mystery Behind Chinatown Raids Remains, EATER CHI. (Oct. 27, 2014, 4:01 PM),
http://chicago.eater.com/2014/10/27/7079837/mystery-behind-chinatown-raidsremains (reporting that Hu Xiaojun did not know why the searches occurred, but
that his Lao You Ju restaurant was back open); Peter Frost, What’s Happening with
Chinatown’s
Tony
Hu?,
CRAIN’S
CHI.
BUS.
(Feb.
28,
2015),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150228/ISSUE01/302289982/whatshappening-with-chinatowns-tony-hu.
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state.124 Lao Beijing was sold in January 2015.125 Lao Hunan, Lao
Yunnan, Lao Shanghai, and Lao Ma La were up for sale in February
2015, and contracts for their transfer had been signed.126
The FBI was also aware that Hu Xiaojun owned restaurants outside
of the Chicago area, notably in Milford, Connecticut and Las Vegas,
Nevada.127 The FBI did not obtain search warrants for either of these
locations. The FBI’s failure to issue search warrants is peculiar in light of
the comprehensive assessment of how Hu Xiaojun allegedly coordinated
the tax manipulations remotely through e-mail correspondence with
managers and bookkeepers.128 There was concern about whether or not
the InfoSpec systems worked with “cloud-based computing.”129
The mystery surrounding Hu Xiaojun’s involvement in sales
suppression has been put to rest with his guilty plea to felony fraud
and money laundering charges alleging that he hid more than $9
million in cash receipts avoiding over $1.1 million in Illinois sales
taxes.130 The guilty plea came three days after the information.131
There is no mention of a zapper in the information, which simply
records that “defendant Hu modified the restaurants’ sales records
and caused the restaurants’ sales records to be modified in order to
conceal cash transactions that had occurred at the restaurants.”132

124. Although he resisted the characterization, Hu Xiaojun appears to many to be
leaving town: “It’s just rumors. A lot of people think I’m leaving Chinatown, but
that’s not true,” he said. “I am thinking a lot about the future, and I plan to pay
more attention to (growing the) Lao Sze Chuan (brand).” Peter Frost, Tony Hu Sells
DINING
CHI.
(Feb.
2,
2015),
Lao
Beijing,
CRAIN’S
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150202/BLOGS09/150209967/tony-husells-lao-beijing (“Hu said he’s been spending much of his time at Lao Sze Chuan
Downtown, which opened Dec. 18 in the Shops at North Bridge at 520 N. Michigan
Ave. He said he’s also entertaining offers to expand to Houston, San Francisco, Los
Angeles and New York.”).
125. Gerzina, supra note 87.
126. Id.
127. Ju Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 76, ¶ 6 n.2.
128. See id. ¶¶ 2 n.1, 38, 52–89, 98–99, 109–27, 132–36, 156–64, 169.
129. See id. ¶ 45, n.11. Other jurisdictions have found cloud-based manipulations.
Richard T. Ainsworth, Sales Suppression as a Service and the Apple Store Solution, 73 ST.
TAX NOTES 343, 351–52 (2014) (referencing manipulations on the Aldelo POS
system installed by one partner to (allegedly) embezzle funds from the other partner
of a North Carolina business through a cloud installation located in California).
130. Plea Agreement ¶¶ 5, 6.a, United States v. Hu Xiaojun, No. 1:16-cr-00316
(N.D. Ill. May 16, 2016).
131. Id. (entering Hu’s guilty plea on May 16, 2016); Information, Unites States v.
Hu Xiaojun, No. 1:16-cr-00316 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2016) [hereinafter Hu Xiaojun
Information] (formally charging Hu on May 13, 2016).
132. Hu Xiaojun Information, supra note 131, at ¶ 5.
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B. U.S. Salesmen
Unlike the FBI in Chicago, when the Washington State Attorney
General’s Office learned that restaurants in their jurisdiction were
using InfoSpec’s Profitek POS system with the Profitek Zapper, it
secured a search warrant to investigate the salesman.133 The search
warrant was approved and sealed,134 but much like the warrant in
Chicago, which was unsealed, the local press began writing about it as
soon as they learned of the investigation.135 Articles were published
and investigative TV coverage of the story began.136
The Attorney General’s Office was able to obtain the warrant
because the Washington Department of Revenue issued a criminal
referral to the Attorney General’s Office.137 A taxpayer who was using a
Profitek POS system informed them that the Profitek Zapper had been
used with the POS system “for many years” to suppress sales.138 The
taxpayer identified John Yin as the individual who sold the Profitek POS
system but “did not admit that John Yin sold her the accompanying
Revenue Suppression USB drive.”139 However, the affidavit confirms
that “this USB only works with Profitek POS Systems.”140
Furthermore, John Yin was the “only licensed reseller of Profitek
Software in Washington State,”141 so a warrant was needed to
determine whether John Yin sold this Profitek Zapper to others.142
Did he sell it to others? If so, how many and to whom? The
Canadian case, R v. Au,143 confirmed that Profitek POS salesmen were

133. Yin Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 77.
134. There is a stamp on the top of the Yin Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note
77, that says “SEALED.” This Article’s author’s personal communication with the
reporter who broke the story revealed that she was at the court house on Monday
morning looking for anything that might have become “unsealed” over the weekend and
she found this search warrant. The norm is for documents to be sealed for sixty days.
135. Matt Day, Bellevue Restaurant Accused of Tax Cheating, SEATTLE TIMES (last
updated Feb. 8, 2016, 2:41 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/technology/
bellevue-restaurant-accused-of-tax-cheating (reporting that investigators searched
Yin’s residence).
136. See, e.g., Amy Clancy, Bellevue Restaurant Owner Charged in Tax Fraud Case,
KIRO7 (last updated Feb. 6, 2016, 9:51 AM), http://www.kiro7.com/news/kiro-newsapp/restaurants-cheating-washington-taxpayers-out-of-millions/61479512.
137. Yin Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 77, at 3.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 4.
142. See id. at 7–11.
143. 2011 B.C.S.C. 75 (Can.).
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instructed to sell Profitek Zappers to clients as a service, and when
they did, their commission was $400.144
The Attorney General’s Office needed to search John Yin’s home,
his automobile, all the technology devices he had, and all the records
he kept.145 The scope of the search would include copies of the
Profitek Zapper, the customer list of all current and former Profitek
clients, and income records.146 In the classic zapper salesman case, it
is common for the salesman to also install, troubleshoot, and provide
all-purpose sales suppression services for zapper customers.147 The
dominance of this “service model” is the real lesson learned from
several undercover sting operations that occurred in New York that
targeted sales suppression.148
A well-known zapper-salesman case provides a great example of
how this type of fraud develops and operates. Michael Roy, a
software developer with the Resto Terminal POS supplier in Quebec,
with the help of his two sons, aided twenty-eight restaurants commit
sales suppression frauds in 2002 and 2003.149 During the day, Mr. Roy
worked on system software for Resto Terminal POS, but in the
evening, he developed a zapper that would defeat the system’s record
retention system.150 Mr. Roy designed and developed a very effective
zapper that was specific to the Resto Terminal POS.151 His two sons,
Miguel and Danny, opened a small consulting business where they
installed their father’s zapper software and assisted restaurants in
committing sales suppression frauds.152
In addition to statutory penalties for the manufacture or retail of
sales suppression technology, the aggregate fraud penalties assessed
against the Roys were $1,064,459.153
Income from the Roys’

144. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
145. Yin Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 77, at 14.
146. Id. at Attachment B.
147. Ainsworth, supra note 129, at 347.
148. Id.
149. Richard Ainsworth, Mass. Zappers—Collecting the Sales Tax that Has Already Been
Paid, (B.U. Sch. Law, Working Paper No. 09-28, 2009); Fines of More Than One Million
Dollars—A Father and His Two Sons Convicted for Tax Evasion in Connection with the
Zapper, REVENU QUÉBEC (May 2, 2003) (on file with author); Stratos Pizzeria - Amende de
Plus d’Un Million pour Fraude Fiscale en Restauration, LA PRESSE MONTREAL (May 2,
2003) at A14, http://collections.banq.qc.ca:81/lapresse/src/pages/2003/P200302/05/03/A/82812_20030503LPA14.pdf.
150. See Fines of More than One Million Dollars, supra note 149.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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“consulting business” was not reported, and, of course, sales of the
zapper were also not reported.154 Instead, to avoid reporting
requirements, transactions were in cash.155 Essentially, the Roys
designed their “business” to receive a percentage of the suppressed
sales at each location they “serviced.”156
Revenue Quebec published the aggregate fraud penalty and tax
assessment against the first ten Stratos restaurants, which
accumulated to $1,816,070.90.157
By the time the Roys were
sentenced, final restaurant totals were not released.158 In its press
releases, Revenue Quebec was not as interested in the restaurants as it
was in the Roys.159 Revenue Quebec had come to appreciate that it
was the salesmen, the installers, and the service providers, more so
than the immediate restaurant users, who were at the heart of the
sales suppression problem.160
Fortunately, the Washington Attorney General and the Washington
Department of Revenue seem to have learned a lesson from the Roys.
The Washington State search warrant was issued against John Yin, the
Profitek salesman, rather than the restaurants.161
Unfortunately, unlike the Washington State Attorney General, the
FBI in Chicago did not internalize the lesson from the Roys. Rather
than pursuing the business that sold the Profitek POS system or the
salesman who was directly involved in the sales, the FBI conducted
searches of nine area restaurants suspected of using the Profitek
Zapper.162 The FBI knew the name of the Profitek retailer in
Chicago, Vision I Computers Inc., and the name of the salesman
assigned to Hu Xiaojun’s account, Wah Chu.163 There are currently

154. All Stratos Restaurants Convicted of Fraud in Connection with the use of a Zapper,
REVENUE QUEBEC (Mar. 18, 2003) (on file with author).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The available breakdown is as follows: $429,179.07 (GST) + $492,023.11
(PST) + $214,589.55 (federal penalties) + $625,028.89 (provincial penalties) +
$55,250.28 (judicial fees). Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Yin Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 77, at 2 (alleging that probable
cause existed that John Yin “committed the crimes of Theft in the first degree (RCW
9A.56.030), Filing of False Tax Returns (RCW 82.32.090) and Unlawful Acts (RCW
82.32.090) during the years 2010 through [2015]”).
162. See Ju Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 76 ¶ 3 (focusing its investigation
on the businesses using the Zapper rather than the Zapper salesman).
163. Id. ¶ 48.
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no pending search warrants or civil or criminal charges involving
either Vision I Computers Inc. or Mr. Wah Chu in the Chicago area.
Indeed, the FBI incorrectly focused on the restaurants despite finding
information that could lead to the salesman.164
The affidavit
demonstrated that restaurant employees informed agents that “a number
of Chinese restaurants utilized the same [Profitek] system, which was
obtained from . . . a company located in the Chinatown Square mall.”165
Additionally, the FBI found an email indicating that the salesman set up at
least four locations with the same POS system.166 Further, the affidavit
recognized that “it is not uncommon that retail businesses that operate
from multiple locations with the same or common management and
ownership often utilize the same or similar POS systems.”167
The FBI does not seem to appreciate that the core problem in
technology-assisted sales suppression are the salesmen, installers, and
other “service providers,” rather than the individual users.168 Even if
the FBI is right, and the central problem is the individual user of
suppression technology, then it should have pursued Hu Xiaojun’s
five other restaurants outside of Chicago’s Chinatown.169 If Hu
Xiaojun is suppressing sales in nine Chinatown restaurants, why
would he not be suppressing sales in his other five more remote
restaurants?
Technology-assisted sales suppression is not
geographically constrained.170 As noted, it moves across and among
jurisdictions both domestically and internationally.171 To stop this
fraud, the FBI needed to think like a technology expert, not like a
restaurateur who is skimming sales when he is at the cash register.172
164. Id. ¶¶ 43, 48 (indicating that the Lao Sze Chuan, Lao Beijing, Lao Shanghai, Lao
Ma La, and Lao Yunnan restaurants were located in the Chinatown mall). Note 10, supra,
indicates that five of Hu Xiaojun’s nine restaurants are also located in the Chinatown mall:
Lao Sze Chuan; Lao Beijing; Lao Shanghai; Lao Ma La; and Lao Yunnan. Id. ¶ 43 n.10.
165. Id. ¶ 43.
166. Id. ¶ 47.
167. Id. ¶ 49.
168. See supra notes 149–60 and accompanying text (discussing the salience of
two cases where the investigation focused on the salesman rather than the
restaurants involved).
169. See Ju Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 76, ¶ 6 n.2 (listing the following
restaurants outside of Chicago’s Chinatown: (1) the Lao Sze Chuan in Milford
Connecticut; (2) the Lao Sze Chuan in Evanston, Illinois; (3) the Lao 18 in
Chicago’s River North neighborhood; (4) the Lao Sze Chuan in Skokie, Illinois, and
(5) Lao Sze Chuan at the Palms in Las Vegas, Nevada).
170. See infra notes 173–79 and accompanying text (expounding on the capability
of committing sales suppression fraud remotely).
171. See id.
172. See id.
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The FBI’s investigation was too narrow, focusing on the notion that
sales suppression occurs locally—where the owner is located.173 The
FBI appears to believe that the person engaged in the suppression
fraud must be present where the records are manipulated.174 This is
evident through the FBI’s fixation on its discussion with a Profitek
employee who explained that the data for each restaurant is preserved
on a local server. The employee explained that the POS system
“maintains a history of the sales transactions . . . on a server that is
integrated into the point of sale system,” so the “data from each point of
sale system is stored on a local server and not a remote system.”175
Hu Xiaojun used a local server in each of his fourteen restaurants,
but this does not mean that he could not have manipulated the
records of any of those establishments remotely with a Profitek
Zapper.176
If a Profitek Zapper was installed at the remote
restaurants, Hu Xiaojun could access each server with “Team Viewer”
software and manipulate the records from a safe distance.177
In fact, the FBI is currently involved in another sales suppression
case involving seven IHOP restaurants in Ohio where the
manipulation of records on a MICROS POS system was performed
remotely, from the owner’s bedroom, with “Team Viewer” software.178
The Indictment in that case indicates that the owners began remotely
manipulating the POS systems shortly after installing the newest
MICROS POS system on the IHOP computers.179
As previously illustrated, the Washington Attorney General appears
to have a sharper focus on the sales suppression problem than the
FBI. When zappers become common in a community, it is imperative
to find the salesmen, installers, and service providers who spread the
fraud.180
The restaurants or other retailers are of secondary

173. See Ju Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 76, ¶ 45 (focusing the investigation on
the fact that the fraud was maintained on a local server rather than committed remotely).
174. See id.
175. See id. ¶ 45 & n.11.
176. See infra notes 178–79 and accompanying text (discussing a scenario where an
individual remotely manipulated records with a Profitek Zapper).
177. See id.
178. Eighteen People Indicted for Roles in $3 Million Schemes Involving Seven IHOP Restaurants,
FBI (May 23, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/cleveland/press-releases/2012/eighteen-peopleindicted-for-roles-in-3-million-schemes-involving-seven-ihop-restaurants.
179. Indictment ¶ 47, United States v. Elkafrawi, No. 3:12CR 262, 2012 WL
8303904 (N.D. Ohio May 22, 2012).
180. See Penelope Lemov, Sales Tax Zapped by Zappers, GOVERNING (May 10, 2012),
http://www.governing.com/columns/public-finance/col-sales-tax-zapped-taxzappers.html (arguing that because the salesman proactively offers a product that is
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importance.181 Perhaps the Attorney General took the approach he
did because the Washington statute directs the enforcement
community to aggressively go after the salesmen.182 Like Quebec, but
unlike Illinois, Washington has penalty provisions that directly target
the people who sell, install, and service zappers.183
The Revised Code of Washington section 82.32.290 makes it unlawful
to possess, sell, or service any sales suppression device.184 It enforces an
additional penalty against individuals who provide and service the
devices.185 The defendant may also be required to pay the state an
amount equal to the sales taxes that were fraudulently withheld.186
It is particularly section 82.32.290(4)(c)(ii), with its emphasis on
furnishing, updating, or repairing sales suppression software that is
the key. It subjects an individual to a penalty that is the greater of (1)
$10,000, (2) the defendant’s gain from the commission of the crime,
or (3) the state’s loss from the commission of the crime.
With regards to the statute’s third prong, the Washington
Department of Revenue must certify the state’s loss because of
taxpayer confidentiality rules.187 In Au, for example, the state’s loss
from Au’s sale of Profitek Zappers was $2,400,000 in federal income
tax and $1,000,000 in Goods and Services Tax.188 This calculation was
generated after audits had been completed on only fourteen of the
twenty-three firms to whom Mr. Au had sold zappers.189 Effectively,
the third prong of the Washington penalty provision would make Mr.
Au and the zapper manufacturer guarantors of total taxes lost.190
If Mr. Au was prosecuted under the Washington statute and if the
final penalty was determined under the third prong of section
82.32.290(4)(c)(ii), then his penalty would be calculated by

extremely difficult to detect, the fault does not lie with the individual restaurant owner,
who could be put out of business if other nearby businesses utilize the zapper).
181. Id.
182. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.32.290(4)(a), (c)(ii) (2013) (creating harsher
penalties for the individual who manufactures or provides the device).
183. Id. § 4(a).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. § 4(c)(ii).
187. See id. (“‘[L]oss’ means the total of all taxes, penalties, and interest certified
by the department.”).
188. See R. v. Au, 2011 B.C.S.C. 75, ¶ 4 (Can.) (calculating the defendant’s
mandatory fine based on the state’s loss from his crime).
189. Id.
190. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.32.290(4)(c)(ii) (noting that a state’s loss is “the
total of all taxes, penalties, and interest certified by the department to be due”).
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aggregating the deficiencies of all twenty-three firms he sold Profitek
Zappers to and then by netting out the amounts actually remitted.
The final amount could be more or less than the $3,400,000 already
determined, but it could not be less than $10,000.191
III. LESSONS LEARNED
Technology-assisted sales suppression fraud differs fundamentally
from traditional tax fraud.192 The technology at the heart of this
fraud needs to be dealt with directly, and most likely with countertechnology.193 With regards to the zapper provided by Mr. Au, it was on
a CD, and the zapper provided by Mr. Yin was on a thumb drive.194 The
current version of the Profitek Zapper is available online and does not
require local installation.195 Additionally, Profitek offers an Online
Ordering Module (OLO), which Profitek suggests can be used to
enhance sales via the internet.196 In this type of situation, both sales
records and the zapper would be located in the cloud, making it
considerably more difficult for an auditor to find. As technology advances,
technology-assisted sales suppression will also inevitably increase.
Enforcement agencies need to develop and employ either: (a)
technology that efficiently reconstructs digital transaction records
that have been suppressed197 or (b) security software, technology that

191. See id. (stating that the penalty shall be the greater of $10,000, the
defendant’s gain, or the state’s loss).
192. See Devlin Barrett & John D. McKinnon, Identity Theft Triggers a Surge in Tax
Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2014, 8:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304834704579401411935878556 (describing traditional tax fraud
as fraud involving individuals lying about their income or deductions, not requiring
the use of complex technology, as opposed to technological sales suppression fraud
in which a fake tax document is created).
193. See ELECTRONIC SALES SUPPRESSION:
A THREAT TO TAX REVENUES,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 4, 35, 38 (2013)
[hereinafter ELECTRONIC SALES SUPPRESSION], http://www.oecd.org/ctp/crime/
ElectronicSalesSuppression.pdf (suggesting that tax administrations should attempt
to improve detection and counter-measures and “invest in acquiring the skills and
tools to audit and investigate POS systems”).
194. R v. Au, 2011 B.C.S.C. 75, ¶ 7 (Can.); Yin Search Warrant Affidavit,
supra note 77, at 3.
195. The author’s personal communication (by telephone) with members of
the Washington Department of Revenue who were conducting the investigation
revealed this information.
196. For an assessment of Profitek, see Profitek, SOFTWAREINSIDER, http://point-ofsale.softwareinsider.com/l/230/Profitek (last visited May 17, 2016).
197. For example, a company called iSeekDiscovery that is in the forensic data
recovery and eDiscovery business promises to be able to recover suppressed data
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encrypts and saves digital records at the time of their creation.198
Most jurisdictions have adopted solution (b).199 The most effective
enforcement regimes involve real-time secure transmission of
encrypted transactional data to a central location200 where artificial
intelligence (AI) conducts a high quality risk analysis in a deployment
that assures taxpayer privacy.201
The primary concern is legislation like House Bill 1051 in South
Dakota, which allows the State’s Department of Revenue (DOR) to
seize automated sales suppression devices or phantomware without a

remotely. iSeekDiscovery, CYBER CRIME FORENSICS, http://www.cybercrimeforensics.com/#!iseekdiscovery/c1naj (last visited May 17, 2016).
198. See Certified Invoicing System (CIS), DATA TECH INT’L, http://dti.rs/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Document-2015.pdf (describing technology that assists
in preventing tax fraud by creating and maintaining evidence of transactions and
providing “reliable documentation of transaction that is . . . highly secure”).
199. See generally Bethany Ansorge, Note, Software Assisted Sales Skimming—Under
Reporting Receipts, 36 MICH. TAX LAW. 46 (2010) (discussing different jurisdictional
approaches to the zapper problem).
200. See Richard Ainsworth, California Zappers: A Proposal for California’s Commission on the
21st Century Economy, (B.U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-01, 2009). A number of
international companies specialize in data encryption of POS systems responding to
government fiscalization regulation, including, for example, Data Tech International Ltd.
(DTI). DTI is based in Serbia. DTI’s main activity is solution development and consultancy.
It assists and advises governments combating tax frauds with commercially available
technology. Certified Invoicing System, DATA TECH INT’L, http://dti.rs/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Document-2015.pdf. Avatar Technologies Ltd. is based in
Portugal. It partners with the Suisse group SGS - SOCIETE Genérale de Surveillance and
the South African GVG - Global Voice Group. Avatar’s main activity involved the
development and distribution of regulator-compliant products (electronic cash registers
(ECRs); point of sale systems (POSs); and enterprise resource planning systems (ERPs)).
About Avatar, AVATAR TECHS., http://www.avatar-technologies.com/about (last visited May
17, 2016). APIS-IT is the agency for IT system support and information technologies, and it
also works in conjunction with the Republic of Croatia and the City of Zagreb. They have
developed very complex IT support systems for the City of Zagreb, and the Tax and
Customs Administrations of the Ministry of Finance in the Republic of Croatia. Questions &
Answers, FISCALIZATION.HR, http://www.fiscalization.hr/en/questions-and-answers (last
visited May 17, 2016). Allagma Technologies Inc., based in Montreal, Canada, has
considerable experience with data encryption in ECRs and POS systems for Revenue
Quebec. Although the Quebec model does not send encrypted data to the Ministry of
Finance (the data is kept secure on site), Allagma has offered to provide this service if
Revenue Quebec moves in this direction. What Did They Ask, ALLAGMA TECHS.,
http://www.allagma.com/what-did-they-ask-STOP.shtml (last visited May 17, 2016).
201. See Richard T. Ainsworth, Phishing and VAT Fraud in CO2 Permits: The Digital
Invoice Customs Exchange Solution, 77 TAX NOTES INT’L 357, 367 (2015) (discussing the
use of state of the art artificial intelligence (AI) over streams of real-time data in
Brazil that is sent to the Ministry of Finance for tax fraud risk analysis).
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warrant.202 Section 5 empowers the state to seize, without a warrant,
“any cash register or device containing an automated sales
suppression device or phantom-ware.”203 Section 1 of the bill states
that phantomware is “a programming option embedded in the
operating system or hardwired into the electronic cash register that
can be used to create a false till, or eliminate or manipulate
transaction data before it is entered in the original till.”204
The South Dakota provision would therefore allow the warrantless
seizure of a restaurant’s POS system.205 Seizure of an establishment’s
POS system could effectively close a business without a warrant.206
There is not even a requirement in the South Dakota proposal that the
operator must have used the sales suppression program before seizure.207
The Washington statute seems to also overreach, but in a different
direction.208 This overreach reflects a fundamental problem in
“bottom-up” traditional audit compliance in the digital world of
zappers and phantomware.209 In this realm of traditional audits,
critical audit data has been removed “from the top” forcing
considerable reconstruction through estimates.210 Once technology
fraud is suspected the audit needs to quickly move to the top of the
technology chain. The audit needs to follow the technology from the
local
establishment
(restaurant),
to
the
technology
salesman/distributor, and back to the manufacturer/originator of

202. See H.R. 1051, 2016 Leg., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016) (prohibiting the use of sales
suppression devices).
203. Section 5 of the Bill sought to amend section 10-59 of South Dakota’s Code.
Id. This bill passed the House Tax Committee 13-1, went through the House floor
without a “no” vote, and on February 29, 2016 passed the Senate 35-0. The bill was
approved and signed by the Governor on March 10, 2016. House Bill 1051, SOUTH DAKOTA
LEGISLATURE, http://legis.sd.gov/legislative_session/bills/Bill.aspx?Bill=1051&Session=2016
(last visited May 17, 2016).
204. H.R. 1051.
205. Id.
206. Though a business could maintain its operations without the POS system, the
loss of the system would be to the business’s great detriment. See With vs. Without,
GREAT LAKES BUS. SYS., http://mjssm.ca/with-vs-without-retail (last visited May 17,
2016) (comparing the benefits of using a POS system versus the difficulty in
operating without the POS system).
207. H.R. 1051.
208. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.32.290(4)(c)(ii) (2015) (penalizing the manufacturers
and sellers of the sales suppression device by imposing high mandatory fines).
209. See ELECTRONIC SALES SUPPRESSION, supra note 193, at 5 (describing the problem
of reconstructing data when evidence of the transaction has been suppressed).
210. See id. at 10 (“Detailed business process information is needed in order to
carry out an audit on the completeness of reported sales.”).
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the technology as quickly as possible to get a sense of the scope and
the true locus of the problem.211 The enforcing statute needs to
support this effort, but the lack of evidence and quantification creates
significant challenges. In the realm of combatting sales suppression,
statutes tend to border on strict liability, and reach for denials of any
right to conduct any business if an individual is tainted with
technology fraud.212 Furthermore, the Washington statute makes the
salesmen and manufacturers of suppression devices guarantors of the
tax revenue “certified” by the DOR.213
Once a zapper or a phantomware program has erased transactional
data from a POS system, reconstructing actual tax losses is very
difficult.214
Traditional tax administration audit protocol, for
example, falls back on estimates.215 Under the Washington statute,
the DOR is allowed to “certif[y]” those estimates as “loss[es],” and
then demand that a statutory guarantor, such as the salesman or the
manufacturer, pay those estimates.216 This kind of overreaching
makes the tax system seem unfair. The following questions will arise
if Washington State brings an action against InfoSpec: How can the
“guarantor” question the DOR’s certification if that process is cloaked
in taxpayer confidentiality? How does the salesman or manufacturer
of a suppression device know the extent of the losses incurred by the
state? Can the certification be challenged?
The Washington Statute also points at solutions in another
direction.217
The Revised Code of Washington, section
82.32.290(4)(a) and (b) states:
(4)(a) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, purchase,
install, transfer, manufacture, create, design, update, repair, use,
possess, or otherwise make available, in this state, any automated
sales suppression device or phantom-ware . . . .
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of
violating this section to engage in business, or participate in any
211. See id. at 29 (indicating that by targeting the zapper and phantomware
suppliers, “it is possible to obtain client lists and identify the users of the software,” as
well as hone in on effective auditing and investigating techniques).
212. See § 82.32.290(4)(a)–(b).
213. § 82.32.290(4)(c)(ii).
214. See ELECTRONIC SALES SUPPRESSION, supra note 193, at 5 (discussing the
difficulty of finding the hidden transactions).
215. See Theresa Esparza et al., Sales Tax Audit Best Practices, TAX ADVISER (July 1,
2012), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2012/jul/esparza-july.html (explaining
that sales tax audits have been utilized to estimate correct amounts of sales taxes).
216. § 82.32.290(4)(c)(ii).
217. § 82.32.290(4)(a)–(b).
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business as an owner, officer, director, partner, trustee, member, or
manager of the business, unless:
(i) All taxes, penalties, and interest lawfully due are paid;
(ii) The person pays in full all penalties and fines imposed on the
person for violating this section; and
(iii) The person, if the person is engaging in business subject to tax
under this title, or the business in which the person participates,
enters into a written agreement with the department for the electronic
monitoring of the business’s sales, by a method acceptable to the department,
for five years at the business’s expense.218

Subsection (iii) is closer to the international standard for dealing
with zappers and phantomware.219 The only problem with the
Washington mandate is that it is limited to individuals convicted of
violating the statute.220 It would be far better for this solution to be
adopted universally, or even voluntarily, with the support of
business groups trying to reduce the incidence of employee theft
or franchise holder embezzlement as was the case with the seven
IHOP franchises in Ohio.221
Nevertheless, even after a limited adoption of a security solution
like that in Washington State, it will be possible (after some time in
operation) to determine actual losses at the restaurant level when
states employ AI to analyze frequency of guests and menu item
selections.222 With these figures, the DOR could reasonably estimate
the state’s “losses.” It might even be possible to use an amnesty at
the retail level to “sign-up” volunteer retailers who would “come
clean” and help the state measure the losses in exchange for
significantly reduced liability. The losses measured by the AI
could still be used as a penalty in separate actions against the
salesman and the manufacturer.

218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id.; see Sara Womble, GTP Director Richard Ainsworth on the $20 Billion Tax
Fraud
States
Are
Overlooking,
B.U. LAW NEWS
(Nov.
19,
2014),
http://www.bu.edu/law/2014/11/19/gtp-director-richard-ainsworth-on-the-20billion-tax-fraud-states-are-overlooking (providing the example of Rwanda’s government,
which has required that all business owners must utilize an Electronic Business Machine,
which creates and forwards a daily electronic report to the tax administration).
220. § 82.32.290(4)(a)–(b).
221. See Eighteen People Indicted for Roles in $3 Million Schemes Involving Seven IHOP
Restaurants, supra note 178 (describing the indictment of individuals who used sales
suppression devices to evade taxes).
222. See Ainsworth, supra note 201, at 367 (explaining how Smartcloud’s AI can
identify questionable transactions that indicate fraud).
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Electronic sales suppression with zappers and phantomware is an
international problem.223 The fraud technology crosses borders
freely.224 To combat the problem of highly mobile technology fraud,
international and domestic tax authorities must share successes and
failures, though government overreach during this process is likely to
occur. Washington and South Dakota may be going too far in some
respects, but if the focus remains on technology, the focus will be
further along to suppress sales suppression than the alternative
approach through large scale traditional audits.225 Did the FBI miss a
zapper in Chicago? Most likely we will never know. The FBI may
have learned that it missed its target in Chicago when it only went
after Hu Xiaojun’s Chinatown restaurants. There was no case
developed against a zapper salesman, the local retail establishment
that might have sold them, or the foreign manufacturer that would
have exported the fraud technology to the United States.226
CONCLUSION
Technology-based sales suppression (zappers, phantomware, and
cloud-based manipulation) is a threat to transaction tax revenue that
is exceedingly difficult to detect, much less prevent, without the
assistance of data security.227 Although it may be overreaching, in
part, the State of Washington is certainly on the right track with its
requirement that a “person [convicted of a violation] . . . enter[] into
a written agreement with the department for the electronic
monitoring of the business’s sales, by a method acceptable to the
department, for five years at the business’s expense.”228 Through this
provision, the State of Washington will most likely bring data security,
common in foreign VAT jurisdictions, into a small segment of its
retail sales tax enforcement effort.229 More needs to be done.
223. See Linda K. Enghagen, Rendering unto Caesar that Which Is Caesar’s: States
Respond to High Tech Tax Evasion with New Criminal Laws, HOSPITALITY LAW, at 4 (Dec.
21,
2015),
http://hospitalitylawyer.com/wp-content/uploads/Manuscript-25Enghagen-final.pdf (discussing how countries worldwide have attempted to tackle
the problem of sales suppression devices).
224. See id. at 4, 17 (noting that the problem is of international proportions,
suggesting that the devices have slowly crossed the borders into other jurisdictions).
225. See ELECTRONIC SALES SUPPRESSION, supra note 193, at 3, 4, 38 (arguing that
developing better technology is essential to countering the zapper threat).
226. See supra Part II.A.
227. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
228. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.32.290(4)(b)(iii) (2015).
229. See Ainsworth, supra note 30, at 534 (explaining that VAT jurisdictions have
expended considerable resources in combatting tax fraud).
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Technology-based sales suppression is global. It is not merely a
local phenomenon. It is a business, not the technology hobby of a
restaurateur (or other businessman).
Finely tuned suppression techniques follow the distribution
network of specific POS systems.230 Because POS systems are
marketed globally so too are the devices that defeat the honest
recordkeeping functionality within them.231 Government auditors have
an exceedingly difficult time when the records presented to them are
the product of sophisticated manipulation. Reconstruction is difficult.
If manipulation is suspected, there are firms that can detect and reestablish records reasonably well.232 Then again, the preferred
solution is for a taxing authority to adopt solutions like the Sales
Recording Module designed by Revenue Quebec,233 and have it
installed by a trusted third-party installer like Allagma Technologies,
which assisted the Quebec government.234
This course of action, however, only gets the auditing process back to where
it was before the technological manipulation. The next necessary step is to
stream encrypted transaction data back to the tax administration and have
AI, like that being installed on three continents by Smart Cloud, identify
where the auditor needs to focus.235

230. See Ainsworth, supra note 21, at 1018.
231. Id.
232. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
233. Acquisition of an SRM, REVENU QUEBEC, http://www.revenuquebec.ca/en/
entreprises/obligationsparticulieres/restauration/mev/default.aspx (last visited May 17,
2016) (explaining that the sales recording module connects to a POS system and
independently records sales transaction data).
234. See Ask Us First, ALLAGMA TECHS., http://www.allagma.com/what-did-they-askSTOP.shtml (last visited May 17, 2016) (stating that Allagma is “one of the leaders in
Canada in POS system implementation and maintenance,” and that it will test and
implement new technologies for businesses); Sales Recording Module (SRM), SIMPLE MENU
RESTAURANT TOUCHSCREEN POINT OF SALE SOFTWARE, http://www.simplemenu.ca/salesrecording-module.cfm (last visited May 17, 2016) (“Allagma is authorised as an official
Sales Recording Module (SRM) installer registered with the Revenu Québec.”).
235. See Ainsworth, supra note 201, at 367 (explaining how Smart Cloud’s AI can
identify questionable transactions that indicate fraud); Company, SMART CLOUD,
http://www.smartcloudinc.com/#!about/ct07 (last visited May 17, 2016).
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